BY WAY OF INTRODUCTION: A THEORETICAL PANORAMA

"Like any field of scientific study, personality psychology needs a descriptive model or taxonomy of its subject matter...a taxonomy would permit researchers to study specified domains of personality characteristics...Moreover, a generally accepted taxonomy would greatly facilitate the accumulation and communication of empirical findings by offering a standard vocabulary or nomenclature.... Most every researcher in the field hopes, at one level or another, to be the one who devises the structure that will transform the present Babel into a community that speaks a common language."

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1. A VIEW OF NEUROSIS, ENDARKENMENT, AND CHARACTER

I will speak here about personality in general and also about the process of what we may call the degradation of consciousness—what is technically called the "theory of neurosis"—and which finds symbolic echo in the spiritual traditions in the mythical stories of the "fall from paradise." I will not make a distinction between the spiritual "fall" of consciousness and the psychological process of aberrated development.

Let me just point out, as a beginning, that this degradation of consciousness is such that in the end the affected individual does not know the difference, i.e., does not know that there has been such a thing as a loss, a limitation, or a failure to develop his full potential. The fall is such that awareness comes to be blind in regard to its own blindness, and limited to the point of believing itself free. It is in view of this that Oriental traditions frequently use, in connection with the ordinary condition of humankind, the analogy of a person who is asleep— an analogy that invites us to conceive that the difference between our potential condition and our present state is as great as the condition between ordinary wakefulness and dreaming.

To speak of a degradation of consciousness, of course, implies the ihea that the process of the "fall" is one of becoming less aware or relatively unconscious; yet the "fall" is not only a fall in "consciousness" proper; it is also, concomitantly, a degradation in the emotional life, a degradation in the quality of our motivation. We may say that our psychological energy flows differently in the healthy/enlightened condition and in the condition that we call "normal." We may say, echoing Maslow, that the fully functioning human being is motivated out of abundance, while in a sub-optimal condition, motivations have the quality of "deficiency": a quality which may be described as a desire to fill up a lack rather than as an over-flowing out of a basic satisfaction.

We may say that the distinction between the "higher" and the "lower" conditions is not only one of abundant love vs. deficient desiring. Still a more complete formulation is that which we find in Buddhism as an explanation of human fallenness in terms of what is called the "three poisons." In the triangular diagram below we may see depicted an interdependence of an active unconsciousness on one hand (commonly called ignorance in Buddhist terminology) and on the other a pair of opposites that constitute alternative forms of deficiency motivation: unconsciousness, aversion, and craving.

Unconsciousness

Aversion   Craving

FIGURE 1

We are all acquainted with the Freudian view that neurosis consists basically in an interference with instinctual life. It was Freud's contention that this basic frustration of the infant in relation to his parents was a "libidinal" frustration, i.e., an interference with early manifestations of a sexual desire, mainly toward the parent of the opposite sex. Today few are willing to endorse this original view of psychoanalysis, and the so-called libido theory has fallen into question, to say the least. Modern psychoanalysts, such as Fairbairn and Winnicot, agree that the origin of neurosis is to be found in an imperfect mothering and, more generally speaking, in problems of parenting. More importance is given today to the lack of love than to the idea of

instinctual frustration or, at least we may say, more importance is given to the frustration of a contact and relationship need than to pre-genital or genital manifestations of sexuality. However it may be, Freud had the great merit of realizing that neurosis was a nearly universal thing, and that it is transmitted generation after generation through the process of parenting. It took a heroic attitude to assert it in his time, yet now it is a platitude to say that the world, as a whole, is crazy, since it has become so obvious.

In the view of some spiritual documents such as the Gospel of Saint John, we find the view that truth is, so to speak, upside down in the world: "The light was in the world, but darkness did not comprehend it." In the Sufi tradition there is a widespread recognition of how a "true man" is also as if upside down, so that he seems to ordinary people an idiot. Yet we may say that not only in the case of heroic beings is truth crucified: it is also in the case of each one of us.

It is not difficult to conceive of the notion that we have all been hurt and, perhaps unconsciously, martyred by the world in the process of our childhood, and in this way we have become a link in the trasmission of what Wilhelm Reich used to call an "emotional plague" infecting society as a whole. This is not only a modem psychoanalytic vision: a curse visiting generation after generation is something that has been known since antiquity. The notion of a sick society is the essence of the old Indian and Greek conceptions of our time as that of a "dark age," a "Kaliyuga"—an age of great fallenness from our original spiritual condition.

I am not saying that mothering is everything; fathering is important too, and later events may have influenced our future development such as is evident in the traumatic war neuroses. Also early events, such as the extent of birth trauma, can have debilitating effects on the individual. Certainly the way in which children are brought into the world in hospitals constitutes an unnecessary shock, and we may conjecture that one born in the twilight and not slapped on the back to stimulate breathing may be better prepared to resist later traumatic conditions in life—just as a child who has been adequately mothered at the beginning of life may be better prepared to take on the traumatic situation of poor fathering.

Let us say, using Horney's metaphor, that we come into the world like the seed of a plant which carries in it certain potentialities and also instinctively awaits certain elements in its environment, such as good earth, water, and sun.

Harlow's experiment with chimpanzees, decades ago, demonstrated, for instance, that a baby monkey needs not only milk, but something furry to hang on to, and that it may develop into a somewhat normal adult given a terry cloth covered dummy of a mother, but not with an artificial mother made of wire, even if it has a bottle in its breast.

Surely the human needs, in order to develop into a fully functioning adult, are more complex, and there are many things that may go wrong, or saying it in an alternative way: there are many ways in which the requirement for good enough parental love is frustrated or betrayed. In some cases parental self-involvement may result in neglect, for instance, while in others too strong a need to lie on the part of the grown-ups may result in the invalidation of the child's experience; still, in other instances, tenderness may be over-shadowed by the expression of violence, and so on.

Let us say that the way we have come to be in this lower world that we inhabit after the fall from Eden—the personality that we identify with and implicitly refer to when we say "I"—is a way of being that we adopted as a way of defending our life and welfare through an "adjustment," in a broad sense of the term, and that usually is more a rebellion than a going along.

In the face of the lack of what he or she needs, the growing child has needed to manipulate, and we may say that character is, from one point of view, a counter-manipulative apparatus.

In this state of affairs, then, life is not guided by instinct but through the persistence of an earlier adaptational strategy that competes with instinct and interferes with the "wisdom" of the organism in the widest sense of the expression. The persistence of such early adaptational strategy may be understood in view of the painful context in which it arose and the special kind of learning which sustains it: not the kind of learning that occurs gratuitously in the developing organism, but a learning under duress characterized by a special fixity or rigidity of what behavior was resorted to in the initial situation

as an emergency response. We may say that the individual is not free anymore to apply or not the results of his new learning, but has gone "on automatic," putting into operation a certain response set without "consulting" the totality of his mind, or considering the situation creatively in the present. It is this fixity of obsolete responses and the loss of the ability to respond creatively in the present that is most characteristic of psychopathological functioning.

While the sum total of such pseudo adaptive learning as I have described is commonly designated in the spiritual traditions as "ego" or "personality" (as distinct from the person's "essence" or soul), I think it is most appropriate to give it also the name of "character."

A derivative from the Greek *charaxo,* meaning to engrave, "character" makes reference to what is constant in a person, because it has been engraved upon one, and thus to behavioral, emotional and cognitive conditionings.

While in psychoanalysis the basic model of neurosis is one of instinctual life hemmed in by activity of a super-ego internalized from the outer world, I am here proposing that our basic conflict and our fundamental way of being at odds with ourselves consists in an interference with organismic self-regulation through our character. It is within character, as a parcel of it, that we can find a super-ego with its values and demands, and also a counter-super-ego (an "under-dog" as Fritz Perls used to call it) who is the object of the super-ego's demands and accusations and who pleads for its acceptance. It is in this "under-dog" that we find the phenomenological referent for the Freudian "id," yet it is a questionable thing to interpret its animating drives as instinctual. For it is not only instinct that is the object of inhibition within us—as a result of ingrained self-rejection and the wish to be something other than what we are: it is also our neurotic needs. The various forms of deficiency motivation, that I will propose that we call our passions, are forbidden to us, both in respect to their greed aspect and in their aspect of hate.

We may describe character as a composite of traits, and understand how each of these traits arose as either an identification with a parental trait or, conversely, out of a desire to not be like a parent in that particular regard. (Many of our

traits correspond to an identification with a parent, and at the same time, an act of rebellion in regard to the opposite trait of the other parent.) Other traits can be understood in terms of more complex adaptations and counter-manipulations. Yet character is more than a chaotic array of traits. It is a complex structure that may be mapped as an arborization, where discrete behaviors are aspects of the more general behaviors and where even the various traits of a broader nature can be understood as the expression of something more fundamental.

The fundamental core of character I will be formulating here is twofold in nature: as a motivational aspect in interplay with a cognitive bias—a "passion" associated to a "fixation." We may picture the position of the ruling passion and a dominant cognitive style in personality by comparing them to the two foci of an elipse, and we may now amplify our earlier statement on character vs. nature, by speaking of the process in greater detail as *an interference with instinct by passion under the sustaining influence of distorting cognition.*

The map of the psyche offered on the following page is a graphic variant of the view of personality offered by Oscar Ichazo and is, in 'several ways, similar to that offered by Gurdjieff. According to both views, human personality (in the sense of character) comprises five "centers." Yet a fully developed human being has awakened in himself the functioning of two higher centers, that are given the names of "higher emotional" and "higher intellectual." While Gurdjieff spoke of a lower or ordinary intellectual center, a lower feeling center, and a lower movement center, Ichazo frequently called this movement center "instinctual," and according to the view that he claimed to transmit, this instinct center is, in turn, divided into three.

FIGURE 2

As of today, Freud's instinct theory of behavior has received severe criticism in psychology. First, the rise of etiology was an inducement to distinguish between instinct as is manifest in animal behavior (with its release mechanisms and highly fixed pattern of expression) and anything that could be called instinct in human life. Then the perceptions of Adler, Homey, Klein and later object relations theorists ended up causing part of the psychoanalytic world to turn not only against Freud's biologism but away from libido theory in particular.[1] Fritz Perls, who may be considered a new Freudian in view of his training with Reich, Homey, and Fenichel, seemed to be following the spirit of the

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[1] Though Guntrip does not look upon drive for relationship as an instinct, others do. Model, for instance, speaks of two classes of instinct, while he speaks of the sexual and aggressive instincts of the id in addition to the newly recognized object relational instinct of the ego.

times as he switched from instinct language to cybernetic language in his concept of organismic self-regulation.

In contrast to such a tendency to drop the notion of instinct in the interpretation of human behavior, the view presented here not only involves an instinct theory—at least it gives instinct one third of the psychological arena—but also coincides with the psychoanalytic notion of neurosis as a perturbation of instinct—and, conversely, healing as a process of instinctual liberation. Unlike Freud's two instinct theories and also unlike Dollard and Miller's view of behavior in terms of a great multiplicity of drives, the theory proposed here acknowledges three basic instincts and goals behind the multiplicity of human motivation (purely spiritual motivation excluded): survival, pleasure, and relationship. I think that though some today (such as Gestaltists) may prefer to employ cybernetic language and say that neurosis implies a perturbation of organismic self-regulation, few would question the great importance of sex, preservation, and the relationship drive and their joint centrality as pervasive goals of behavior. Though Marx's interpretation of human life emphasized the first, Freud's the second, and present day Object-Relations theorists the third, I do not think that anybody has embraced a view that explicitly integrates these three fundamental drives.

Unlike traditional religions, which implicitly equate the instinctual domain with the sphere of the passions, the present view of the optimal mental state as one of free or liberated instinct, is one for which the true enemy in the "Holy War" traditionally prescribed against the false or lower self is not the animal within, but the realm of deficiency motivation: that of the "passionate" drives that contaminate, repress, and stand in place of instinct (as well as the cognitive aspects of the ego which, in turn, sustain the passions).

As may be seen in the map, the cognitive and emotional aspects of the personality are represented as operating in two alternative modalities, according to the level of awareness, while the instinctual center is represented only once. This may be viewed as a questionable convention, for there is the understanding that instinct can also manifest in two contrasting ways, either as bound instinct within the channels provided by

the ego or in a state of freedom where instinct is regarded as belonging to the essence proper.[2]

One who is acquainted with the use of "essence" in Sufism will understand the referent of this word to be that deepest aspect of human consciousness, which exists "in God" and becomes manifest to the individual after an annihilation ("fana"), but may find this meaning inconsistent with the present mapping of discrete attributes of the essence such as the states belonging in the sphere of higher intellect, higher feeling, and instinct. The contradiction disappears if we make a distinction between consciousness proper and the workings of the mind in the conscious state (as distinct from the egoic states). When used in this sense, however, we must beware of reifying essence, and I can repeat here what I wrote in Ennea-type Structures:

"The broadest distinction in the body of Fourth Way Psychology that I seek to outline, is between 'essence' and 'personality' — between the real being and the conditioned being with which we ordinarily identify; between the greater and the lesser mind. Where Gurdjieff spoke of personality, Ichazo spoke of ego — more in line with recent usage (ego trip, ego death, ego transcendence, and so on) than with the meaning given to 'ego' in today's ego psychology. The distinction is similar to that proposed today by Winnicott between the 'real self' and the 'false self,' yet it may be misleading to speak of essence, soul, true self or atman as if the reference were something fixed and identifiable. Rather than speak of essence as a thing, then, we should think of it as a process, an ego-less, unobscured, and free manner of *functioning* of the integrated human wholeness."

Thus we can say that the "map of the psyche" offered above is only complete if we claim that it also maps the space in which the centers of personality and essence exist––a space that may be taken as an apt symbol of consciousness itself. Since the awareness in the context of which "the lower centers" may be

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[2]Though **I have said in** *Ennea-type Structures* **that pure instinct can be mapped as three dots in contrast to the representation of bound instinct as three enneagrams, I should quote Ichazo as claiming that while in meditative absorption this is so, in the workings of expression of the essence in life it can be mapped as an enneagram in which are combined the three central triangles of the instinct enneagrams.**

said to exist is degraded, I have shaded it in the modified map in Figure **3,** while the three "higher centers," in contrast, are mapped within a white circle, to convey the notion of trinity in unity, characteristic of the Fourth Way and the Christian tradition in general.

ESSENCE

PERSONALITY

FIGURE **3**

2. THE CHARACTERS

Those acquainted with Gurdjieff's work will know how important in this approach to "awakening" was that aspect of self-knowledge consisting in the discernment of one's "chief feature," i.e., a pervasive characteristic of the personality that might be understood as a center of it (much as Cattell and others conceive of "source traits," each of which is conceived as the root of a trait tree). The view presented here goes further in claiming that the number of possible "chief features" are not unlimited— but the same as the number of basic personality syndromes. Additionally, we will be speaking of two central features in each character structure, as intimated above: one, the chief feature proper, consisting in a peculiar way of distorting reality, i.e. a "cognitive defect"; the other, in the nature of a motivational bias, a "ruling passion."

We may think that character can be structured along a distinct number of basic ways, that result in the relative emphasis of one or another aspect of our common mental structure. We may say that the "mental skeleton" that we all share is like a structure that can, like a crystal, break in a certain number of ways that are pre-determined, so that among the set of main structural features any given individual (as a result of the interaction between constitutional and situational factors) ends up with one or the other in the foreground of his personality—while the remaining features are in a more proximate or more remote background. We might also use the analogy of a geometric body that rests on one or another of its facets; we all share a personality, with the same "faces," sides, and vertices, but (in the language of the analogy) differently oriented in space.

According to this view there are nine basic characters (in contrast to Sheldon's three, Hypocrates' four temperaments, Lowen's five bioenergetic types, and the five dimensions of some modern factorialists, for instance). Each of these exists, in turn, in three varieties according to the dominant intensity of the self-preservation, sexual, or social drives (and the presence of specific traits that are a consequence of a "passional" distortion of

corresponding instinct, which is "channelled" and "bound" under the influence of the individual's dominant passion)[3]. There are, of course, nine possible dominant passions and each is associated to a characteristic cognitive distortion, as well as with one, two, or three mental characteristics derived from the instinctual sphere, as just described.

The nine characters in the view presented here do not constitute simply a collection of personality styles: it is, rather, that of an **organized** set of character structures, in that specific neighborhood relationships, contrast, polarities, and other relations are observed between them. These relations are mapped according to the traditional geometric structure called an "enneagram."[4] Correspondingly, I will speak of ennea-types— short for "personality type according to the enneagram."

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[3] I will not go into the 27 subtypes in the present volume, except to some extent, in the case of the varieties of suspicious character — since the forms of ennea-type VI are so differentiated that to speak of them in general would obscure their no less striking differential characteristics.

[4] In *In Search of the Miraculous,* Ouspensky quotes Gurdjieff saying that the teaching that he presented was completely autonomous, independent from any other paths (such as Theosophy or Western Occultism), and that it has remained hidden to this day. He continues to say that as other teachings use symbolic method, this one does too, and that one of its main symbols is the enneagram. This symbol consisting in a circle divided in nine parts by points that are connected between themselves by nine lines in a certain pattern expresses the "law of seven" and its connection with the "law of three." Also in the same book Ouspensky quotes Gurdjieff as saying that in a general way the enneagram must be distilled as a universal symbol and that each science may be interpreted through it, and that, for somebody who knows how to use it, the enneagram makes books and libraries useless. If an isolated person in the desert drew the enneagram on the sand, he could read the eternal laws of the universe, and he would learn each time something new that he had ignored completely thus far. He also says that the science of the enneagram has been kept a secret during a long time, and now it is more in the reach of all, yet only in an incomplete and theoretical way that is almost useless to one who has not been instructed in this science by one who has mastered it.

Figure 4

It has been an aspiration of modem psychology to organize the known characterological syndromes in what has been called a circumplex model. "Over approximately the past 30 years, various investigators have endeavored to demonstrate that the structure of personality traits, when defined by an individual's interpersonal behavior, may best be represented in terms of this circumplex model."[5] This is a circular continuum (shown in Figure 5) with adjoining characters being most similar to each other, while oppositions along the circle correspond to bipolarities; in contrast, the enneagram emphasizes tripolarity. One circumplex model was proposed by Leary in connection with his interpersonal system, another by Schaefer as the way to organize data resulting from his study of parent-child interactions. Lorr and MacNair in 1963 reported an "interpersonal behavior circle," resulting from a factor analysis of clinicians' ratings on various kinds of interpersonal behavior—which was interpreted as reflecting nine clusters of variables. In

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[5]Cooper, Arnold M., Allen J. Frances, and Michael H. Sacks, *Psychiatry, Volume* I, *The Personality Disorder and Neurosis* (New York: Basic Books, 1990). Literature on the circumplex models cited in this paragraph, as well as the model in Figure 5, may be found in this same collection.

addition to these theoretically-derived circumplex models, Conte and Plutchik demonstrated that a circumplex model maps the main domain of interpersonal personality traits. By two different methods, one an analysis of similarity ratings of terms, another an application of factor analysis to semantic differential ratings of terms, they produced an identical empiric circular ordering of terms on the basis of their loading of the first two factors. A later study by the same authors examines the diagnostic concepts of DSM-II personality disorders. They found that these could also be arranged in a circumplex order fairly similar to that resulting from the 1967 study.

A circumplex structure of DSM III, Axis II personality disorders based on direct similarity scaling and semantic differential profile similarity.

Figure 5

Perhaps the scheme pictured in Figure 6 below is the most convincing circumplex model thus far. Agreeing also with current opinion in terms of the grouping of DSM lll syndromes, the present characterology recognizes three fundamental groups: the schizoid group, with an orientation to thinking (that I will here designate as ennea-types V, VI, and VII), the hysteroid group, with an orientation to feeling (ennea-types II, lll, and IV) and another body build (which Kretschmer might have called collectively epileptoid) who are constitutionally the lowest in ectomorphia and are predominantly oriented to action.


Figure 6

I now turn to a briefest description of the nine basic characters following the standard numbering given to points along the enneagram circle.

The first kind of personality style (and neurotic style, of course) is, in this view, both resentful and well intentioned, correct and formal, with little spontaneity and an orientation to duty rather than pleasure. Such people are demanding and critical towards themselves and others, and I will call them perfectionistic rather than branding them with a psychiatric label —though the syndrome corresponds to the obsessive personality

in DSM III. While in the case of each one of the ennea-types we find that it coincides with a known clinical syndrome, it is also true that everybody may be regarded as the bearer of one personality orientation or another, and that each may be seen in specific levels ranging from that of psychotic complication to that of the subtlest residues of childhood conditioning in the life of saints.

Ennea-type II, in this Fourth Way characterology is one that I have characterized through the paradox of an egocentric generosity and corresponds to the histrionic personality of DSM III. Representative individuals are usually hedonistic, light-hearted and rebellious in the face of anything rigid or restrictions on their freedom. Early in the life of my first group in Berkeley a student, Dr. Larry Efron, summarized the characters in a collage of caricatures from William Steig, which he gave me on occasion of a birthday party. In the collage of Steig's caricatures, type II is represented by a clownish figure that contrasts with the struggling mountain climber that represents the hardworking and obsessional type I.

Enneatype III is interestingly not to be found in DSM III in spite of constituting the most American of characters (as Fromm observes, in connection with what he called the "marketing orientation"). I agree with Kernberg's dissatisfaction concerning the non inclusion of a form of hysterical personality not identical to the histrionic, in that the representative individual is not inconsistent or unpredictable in his emotional reactions and displays much more control as well as loyalty and the capacity for sustained emotional involvements. If the term hysterical were not also employed colloquially to designate the overly-dramatic and impulsive personality of type IV, it could be recommended to include both hysterical and histrionic in a future revision of the American *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual.* I find that most of Lowen's clinical examples in his book on *Narcissism* are type III individuals —yet the word "narcissistic" which has also been employed by Homey to describe the character, seems inappropriate because of alternative usage. This is the characterological disposition observed by Riesman, who discussed it in terms of other-direction. In the enneagram of caricatures, type III is represented by a medical doctor, emblematic of professional success and respectability, as well as

professional know-how. Type III individuals seek appreciation in the eyes of others through achievement, effectiveness, and social graces, are both controlling and controlled, and constitute one of the happier characters in the enneagram.

Type IV is represented in the Steig caricature through an image that evokes the suffering victim of life circumstances and people. This corresponds to the self-defeating personality included in the revision of DSM III. It also corresponds to what Homey used to call masochistic character, in which there is a poor self-image, a disposition to suffer more **than** is necessary, a great dependency on the love of others, a chronic sense of rejection, and a tendency to **discontent.**[6]

The caricature of isolation in point 5 is appropriate for a disposition that may be regarded as the interpersonal style that emerges from **and** sustains retentiveness. This corresponds to the schizoid personality of DSM III and to individuals that not only have few relations but fail to feel solitary in their aloneness, who seek to minimize their needs, who are shy and have great difficulty in expressing their anger.

The warrior in point 6 again conveys a connotation apparently very different from fear, and yet alludes to a belligerence arisen from fear of authority and sustained through a (counterphobic) avoidance of the experience of fear. The warrior image is an appropriate caricature of only some **ennea**-type VI individuals, however, and not of the overtly weak and fearful. The subtypes are very differentiated in ennea-type VI, so that it embraces, along with the **avoidant** personality of DSM III, also the paranoid, still another form of suspicious character with more obsessive characteristics, as will be discussed in the appropriate chapter.

Type VII corresponds to Karl Abraham's oral-receptive or oral-optimistic character and is echoed today in DSM III by the narcissistic syndrome. The typical individual is one displaying nonchalence, a sense of entitlement, an orientation to pleasure and a more consciously strategic attitude in life than in most characters. The caricature figure in point 7 has, instead of a head, what seems to be wiring. It suggests living in fantasy and a

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[6] As will be seen, I believe that the borderline personality *sensu strictu* corresponds to a complication of the same.

tendency to forget the real world through an absorption in planning and scheming.

Type VIII corresponds to Reich's phallic-narcissistic type and is echoed today in DSM III in the anti-social and sadistic personalities. It is that of a person oriented to power, domination, and also violence. At point 8 we see a caricature of somebody who stands on a platform in order to talk down to people or rather to harangue them with powerful voice and demeanor. It is appropriate, though it leaves out a representation of sadistic behavior.

At point 9 the human figure is sitting as fits a depiction of laziness, and the whole drawing suggests vacationing under the shade of a palm tree on a tropical beach. While appropriate to the depiction of laziness in the conventional sense, it does not allude to the psychological laziness of one who does not want to look at himself, nor to the characteristic of resigned over-adaptation of type IX. In the DSM III classification type IX corresponds to the dependent personality—though the name is not very appropriate since dependency is shared by a number of personalities and I do not think that it constitutes the core of the type IX character structure, that is also resigned, self-postponing, gregarious, and conforming.[7]

Rather than illustrating the characters with the above-described caricatures, the essence of which can be translated into words, I have shown in Figure 7—as additional information—a drawing by Margarita Femandez that conveys some of the constitutional and gestural characteristics of the ennea-types.

Mapping the characterological syndromes onto a circle implies the claim that there are neighborhood relationships between them—and this may be readily observed—yet it would not describe the situation completely, since adjoining characters are also contrasting in some ways. While type I is rigid, type II is intolerant to rigidity, for instance, and while type II is impulsive, type III is controlled. Type III, in turn, is happy and type IV sad, type IV emotional and clinging and type V intellectual and detached; and so on. When we consider the realm of passions alone, however, each of them may be understood as a hybrid of the two adjoining ones.

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[7]DSM-III-R.

FIGURE 7

Generally speaking, a person who embodies any one of the nine characters can easily see in himself the two adjoining ones in the map. Thus, an ennea-type III individual, whose life is geared to pleasing and succeeding, can coherently understand his behavior in life from the perspective of type II and type IV respectively; likewise, an ennea-type IV person can understand his experience as one of frustrated type III or interpret his actions and feelings from the vantage point of clinging and a sense of impoverishment as in the schizoid individual.

More generally, of course, each person's life or experience may be interpreted from any of the nine perspectives, and so it is that the perspective that sees fear behind everything —so central to psychoanalytical thinking—has been regarded as universally applicable throughout decades of experience. Yet, surely, some interpretations strike home more easily in some characters, while others are comparatively more remote.

While the interpretation that emphasizes the ruling passion and cognitive perspective typical to each one of the points in the enneagram is the most fitting, we may say that the

adjoining ones come second—particularly that one among them that happens to be in the corner of the central triangle in the map. Thus, concern with self-image or narcissism is even closer than the schizoid characteristic, as an interpretational background for type IV. Likewise in the case of ennea-type VII we may say that it is essentially a fear-based character belonging in the schizoid group.[8] Yet, it is also strongly related to vindictive character in its impulsive, rebellious, and hedonistic characteristics.

Ennea-type VIII, on the other hand, is essentially lazy-minded (type IX), though its characteristic odd inwardness-avoidance is covered up with the typical intensity with which the individual seeks to make himself feel alive, escaping the sense of deadness attendant upon his or her lack of interiority.

The characters mapped in the six and nine comers of the enneagram stand, each of them, like in point three, between a polarity. While it is a polarity of sadness and happiness at the right side comer (IV-11), it is a polarity of aloofness and expressiveness at the left side (V-VII), and one of amoral or anti-moral and over-moral at the top (VIII-I).

The relations indicated by the arrows connecting the points in the inner triangle of the enneagram, and also those connecting the rest of the points in the sequence 1, 4, 2, 8, 5, 7, 1 may be said to correspond to psycho-dynamic relations, when the enneagram is understood as a map of the individual's mind, as will be explained in connection with the enneagram of passions. When the map stands for a set of characters we may take them to point out the covert presence in each of the one preceding it in the flow, as is not apparent when we consider the enneagram of the passions that constitute the motivational dispositions behind the characters (see below).

In addition to the relationships of neighborhood and those mapped by the lines in the enneagram's "inner-flow," we may see also relations of opposition in the enneagram: just as types I and V stand at opposite ends on a straight line, so do the characters type VIII and type IV, and along the horizontal axis, type VII and type II.

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[8]In the broader sense of the term––distinct from the use of schizoid for ennea-type V specifically.

I am calling the I-V axis the "anal" axis of the enneagram, inasmuch as both the schizoid character and the obsessive-compulsive character may be said to be "anal" in terms of the descriptions of Freud and Jones, as I am discussing in the first and second chapters of this book respectively.

The IV-VIII axis, on the other hand, I am calling, in memory of Karl Abraham, the oral-aggressive axis; for true as it may be that it is mostly the frustrated and complaining type IV character that has been called oral-aggressive, the characteristics of ennea-type VIII are deserving enough of the appellation.[9]

The II-VII axis I am, analogously, calling oral-receptive, for true as it may be that it is type VII that best corresponds to Abraham's oral-optimist, histrionics are not only "oedipal" but oral-receptive as well.

In contra-distinction to the characters discussed thus far, I think that ennea-type VI and ennea-type III may be called phallic—though all but the counter-phobic type VI can also be regarded as inhibited phallic, while type III is, in its cockiness, a form of a converse, "excited" version of the phallic disposition.

I have said nothing about ennea-type IX in terms of what echoes there may be of the pre-genital syndromes and early genital orientations. This is a character that may well be called pseudo-genital for in most instances it seems less pathological than others, essentially adjusted, contented, loving, and hard-working. It is a character that mimics mental health (and thus what the word "genital" was originally meant to mean). The story of type IX is that of an individual who grew up too fast, who matured under pressure, losing his or her childhood. Along with this over-maturity, however, there lingers in the individual's experience, just under the threshold of ordinary awareness, a regressive disposition deeper and more archaic than that of the pre-genital stages—a deep wish on the person's part to stay in his or her mother's womb and the sense of never having come out. Types I and VIII also belong together in the enneagram as mirror images of each other, at each side of point IX. I have characterized them, when speaking of the characters adjoining type IX, as anti-moral and over-moral, but it remains to

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[9]It may be noted that Fritz Perls, who placed so much stress on deliberation and on oral-aggression, was himself of the phallic-narcissistic, vindictive type.

say of them that otherwise they share an active disposition. In the same way ennea-type V and ennea-type IV at the bottom of the enneagram offer a sharp contrast (intense and phlegmatic, we may call them) and yet are also similar in their fragility, hyper-sensitivity, and withdrawnness. Ennea-type II and ennea-type VII, which we discussed as two forms of an oral-receptive disposition, can also be regarded as a third pair, along with I-VIII and V-IV, in that they are mainly expressive (rather than active and introversive).

On the whole we may speak of a right side and a left side of the enneagram in symmetry around point 9, and we see that the right side is more social, and the left side anti-social; or, in other terms: there is more seduction on the right and more rebellion on the left. I have no doubt that, at least in the Western world, there is a predominance of men on the left and women on the right, though some characters are more differentiated in terms of the sex ratio. While I and III are more common among women, they are not nearly as feminine in terms of membership as type II and type IV. On the left side the most distinctly masculine character is VIII.

Sharp contrast can be seen between the characters in the pair of VII-IV as well as that of V-II. In the former case this is a contrast between happy character and sad character, and in the latter a contrast between cold aloofness and warm intimacy.

Finally, there is a contrast to be observed between the top and the bottom of the enneagram. While type IX, at the top, represents a maximum of what I have called a defensive extraversion—i.e., an avoidance of inwardness—that goes hand-in-hand with contentedness, the bottom of the enneagram represents a maximum of inwardness and also discontentedness. We may say that those at the bottom of the enneagram never feel good enough or satisfied enough, regard themselves a problem, and are also identified as pathological by the outside world, while type IX is a position where the individual is least likely to make a problem of himself or appear pathological to others. A common feature links type IX to both type IV and type V, however: depression. Between type IX and type IV depression

proper is the common element.[10] Ennea-type V may be regarded as depressed too, in terms of apathy and unhappiness, yet the most visible commonality between type IX and type V is that of resignation: a giving up of relationship in V, a resignation without the outer loss of relationship in IX (a resignation in participation), that gives the character its self-postponing and abnegated disposition.

3. THE DYNAMIC CORE OF NEUROSIS

Taking for granted that emotional deterioration is supported by a hidden cognitive disturbance (fixation), I will now examine this realm of passions, i.e., the sphere of the main deficiency-motivated drives that animate the psyche. It is logical to begin with them since, tradition tells us, they constitute the earliest manifestation of our fallenness process in early childhood. While it is possible to recognize the predominance of one or another of these attitudes in children between five and seven, it is not until an age of about seven years (a stage well known to developmental pscyhologists from Gesell to Piaget) that there crystallizes in the psyche a cognitive support for that emotional bias.

The word passion has long carried a connotation of sickness. Thus in his *Anthropologie*, Kant says that: "An emotion is like water that breaks through a dike, passion like a torrent that makes its bed deeper and deeper. An emotion is like a drunkenness that puts you to sleep; passion is like a disease that results from a faulty constitution or a poison."

I think that one of the grounds on which passions have been regarded as unhealthy has been an observation of the pain and destructiveness that they entail—in turn consequences of their craving nature. We may say that they are facets of one basic "deficiency motivation." The use of the Maslowian language, however, need not blind us to the appropriateness of the

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psychoanalytic notion of orality: passions may be seen as a result of our retaining as adults too much of the attitudes that we all shared as infants at the breast: of a being stuck in a position of excessive sucking and biting in face of the world.

Not only is the word "passion" appropriate for the lower emotions in that they exist in interdependence with pain (pathos), but also because of its connotation of passivity. It may be said that we are subject to them as passive agents rather than free agents—as Aristotle predicated of virtuous behavior and modern psychology of mental health. Spiritual traditions mostly agree in regard to a potential disidentification from the passionate realm made possible by the intuition of transcendence.[11]

Inspection of the enneagram of the passions in figure 8 shows that three of them (at points 9, 6, and **3**) occupy a position more central than the others. Also, because of the symbolism of the enneagram, according to which the different points along it correspond to degrees and intervals in the musical scale, psychospiritual laziness, at the top, stands as the most basic of all —being, as it were, the "do" of the passions.

The fact that these three mental states are mapped at the corners of the triangle in the enneagram of passions conveys a statement to the effect that they are cornerstones of the whole emotional edifice, and that the states mapped between them can be explained as interactions in different proportions of these three.

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[11]While it is a goal of this tradition of "work-on-self" to bring about a shift in the control of behavior from the lower emotional center of the passions to a higher center, a still further stage is envisioned: a shift from the "lower intellectual center" of ordinary cognition—pervaded by wrong views of reality formed in childhood (fixations)—to the higher intellectual center of contemplative-intuitive understanding.

FIGURE 8 - ENNEAGRAM OF PASSIONS

It may be observed that the proposition of a psychological inertia as a cornerstone of neurosis echoes the learning theory of neurosis as conditioning, while the other two points in the inner triangle echo the Freudian view of neurosis as a transformation of childhood anxiety and the existential one, which envisions inauthentic being and "bad faith as the basis of pathology.

The interconnections shown between these three points (in the form of sides of the triangle) constitute what we may call psychodynamic connections, so that each may be said to underlie the next in a sequence mapped by arrows between them in a counter-clockwise direction. If we read this psychodynamic sequence starting at the top, we may say that a lack of the sense of being (implicit in the psychological inertia or "robotization" of sloth) deprives the individual of a basis from which to act, and thus leads to fear. Since we must act in the world, however, as much as we may fear it, we feel prompted to solve this contradiction by acting from a false self rather than (courageously) being who we are. We build, then, a mask between ourselves and the world, and with this mask we identify. To the extent that while we do this, we forget who we

truly are, however, we perpetuate the ontic obscuration that, in turn, supports fear, and so on, keeping us in the vicious circle.

Just as the sides of the "inner triangle" indicate psychodynamic connections between the mental states mapped at points nine - six - three - nine (in that sequence), it remains to be said that the lines connecting points 1 - 4 - 2 - 8 - 5 - 7 - 1 likewise indicate psychodynamic relations and that each passion may be understood as grounded in the previous one.

Let us consider the case of pride. It is easy to see that just as the individual's expression of pride constitutes an attempt to compensate an insecurity in respect to self-worth, prideful people, as a group, have in common a repression and over-compensation for the sense of inferiority and lack that is dominant in envy. In envy, in turn, we may speak of anger that has turned inward in an act of psychological self-destruction. While in the case of angry and disciplinarian character we may see an attempt to defend oneself from the oral-receptive, spoiled, or self-indulgent attitude of gluttony.

Ennea-type VII, in turn, in its expressive skill, persuasiveness, and charm seems the very opposite of the laconical awkwardness of ennea-type V and yet can also be seen as the way out of it, an over-compensation of deficiency to false-abundance, similar to that through which envy is transformed into pride. Type V or schizoid character, again, is as opposite as can be from the confrontative, impulsive, gross, and aggressive character of the lusty, rebellious type VIII, yet it is possible to understand that moving away from people and the world as an alternative form of expression of vindictiveness—a vindictive decision to not give one's love to others as well as a vindictive willingness to erase the other from one's inner life. When we consider the tough, bullying, and over-masculine ennea-type VIII, finally, we find again that it is the very opposite of the tender, sensitive, and over-feminine histrionic type II. Yet lust may be seen as an exaltation and transformation of pride, in which dependency is not only denied but transformed into a predatory, exploitative, or overwhelming attitude toward others.

As for the relation between passions mapped as adjacent along the circle, it is possible to view each as a hybrid between those on each side. Thus pride may be regarded as a hybrid of vanity (an excessive concern with the self-image) and anger—

where anger is implicit as an assertive self-elevation vis-a-vis others; envy, in turn, may be understood as a hybrid of vanity with the sense of impoverishment of avarice, which combination results in a sense of not being able to live up to the requirements of vanity.

Rather than characterizing the passions—which I expect to be doing in the successive chapters of this book as I describe the characterological disposition in which they predominate—I will only say that we need to return to an original meaning for the traditional words. "Anger," for instance, will be used here as a more inward and basic antagonism in the face of reality than an explosive irritation; "lust" as more than an inclination to sex or even pleasure: a passion for excess or an excessive passionateness to which sexual satisfaction is only one possible source of gratification; likewise "gluttony" will be understood here not in its narrow sense of a passion for food, but the wider sense of a hedonistic bias and an insatiability; and "avarice" may or may not include avarice in its literal meaning and will designate a fearful and greedy holding on, a withdrawn alternative to the outreaching attachment out of lust, gluttony, envy, and other emotions.

Though the enneagram of passions graphically displays a statement to the effect that in each individual, nine basic forms of deficiency motivation exist as a system of interdependent components, the view of character elaborated in this book involves a complementary postulate—to the effect that in each individual one or another of the passions (and the corresponding fixation) is dominant. Yet in contrast to the view of some Christian theologians that there is a hierarchy of seriousness among the capital sins—and also in contrast to the view of contemporary psychology that the characters (in which these different mental states are most distinct) not only arise from different stages in development but are more or less serious or pathological than others—this "Fourth Way" view asserts that the passions are equivalent both in ethico-theological and in prognostic terms. This statement may be translated to imply that while some characters may be more successfully treated than others by present-day psychotherapy and interpretations of mind, the path of transformation is not radically better or worse

for the different personalities in terms of the traditional approaches of work-on-self and meditation.

4. COGNITIVE DISTORTION STYLES

Though not identical to what Freud meant by it, the word "fixation" brings to mind that it is through cognitive disturbance that we are most "stuck"—each fixation constituting, as it were, a rationalization for a corresponding passion. While the passions are the early core of psychopathology out of which the realm of the fixations has emerged, according to this view the fixations are the ones that structurally underlie the passions in the present.


FIGURE **9**

Ichazo defined the fixations as specific cognitive defects —facets of a delusional system in the ego—yet the names he gave to them sometimes reflect either the same notion as the dominant passions do or associated characteristics that failed to satisfy his own definition. I reproduce in Figure 9 the enneagram

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

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of fixations according to Ichazo as reported by Lilly in Tart's Transpersonal *Psychologies*.[12]

Here it may be seen that the reference to resentment in point 1 is nearly redundant with "anger," and in the case of point 2, flattery refers mostly to "self-flattery," which is inseparable from the self-aggrandizement of pride. In the case of point **3,** Ichazo did provide words with significantly different meanings for the emotional and the cognitive aspects of a character, and yet I have questioned his ascribing of restlessness in the pursuit of achievement to the fixation realm and of deceit to the emotional realm of the passions.[13]

In the "Mendelejeffian" nomenclature proposed in Arica, using terms beginning with "ego" and containing the first letters of the fixation, the designation "ego-melan" does contain information different from envy, for it addresses itself to the "masochistic" aspect of the character in question, the seeking of love and care through the intensification of pain and helplessness. Yet in point 5, again, the word he proposes, "stinginess," fails to go beyond the scope of avarice. The same is the case in point 6, for "cowardice" does not give much more information than the passion of fear. Though "cowardice" does entail a meaning of "fear in the face of fear," I have preferred to regard accusation, especially self-accusation, as the central cognitive problem of ennea-type VI, as I elaborate in the corresponding chapter.

When I first heard Ichazo teach Protoanalysis in his lectures at the Instituto de Psicologia Aplicada, the word he used for the fixation in point 7 was *charlataneria,* Spanish for charlatanism. Later, addressing himself to an English-speaking audience, he labeled the personality "ego-plan." Planning evokes

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[12]"The Arica Training" chapter by John C. Lilly and Joseph E. Hart in Transpersonal Psychologies, edited by Charles Tart (El Cerrito, CA: Psychological Processes, 1983).

[13]In chapter seven I propose the appropriateness of regarding vanity as belonging to the same sphere as pride (a passion for being in the eyes of the other, rather than a passion for self-inflation) and for regarding deceit and self-deception the cognitive aspect of ennea-type III (in virtue of which the individual identifies with the false self).

the tendency of type VII to live on projects and fantasies and to substitute imagination for action.

In speaking of "ego-venge," again, Ichazo points to a characterological disposition that may be regarded central in the corresponding type, and provides information complementary to that of its "lusty" aspect: ennea-type VIII is not only Dionysian and passionate, but hard and dominant, the bearer of a prejudiced view of life as struggle where the powerful succeed.

In the case of point 9, once more Ichazo's word "ego-in," in reference to indolence, is redundant with "laziness," the word used for the dominant passion. If laziness is understood as psychospiritual inertia—akin to an automatization of life and a loss of inwardness—the implicit conviction underlying the life strategy of ennea-type IX may be regarded as one that over-emphasizes the value of over-adaptation and abnegation.


FIGURE 10

A slightly different emphasis comes into play if we choose names for the fixations in view of the identification claimed by Ichazo between these and the "chief feature" of each personality type. The words in Figure 10 fit both definitions of

"fixation": they are appropriate to designate the most outstanding feature in the corresponding character structure and they may be understood as inseparable from a cognitive operation.

Thus deception (more appropriate than "deceit" in this context) involves self-deception as well as pretending to others, and a cognitive confusion between what is the case and what is claimed to be true. In the case of vindictiveness, too, there is reference to the chief characteristic of punitiveness in ennea-type VIII, and also to an implicit view—inseparable from it—that irrationally seeks to make right the past through a retribution of damage or hurt in the present.

In the case of the false generosity and satisfaction of ennea-type II, again this may be regarded as the chief feature and a cognitive mistake on the part of the person akin to deception. The same may be said of the self-frustrating characteristic of ennea-type IV, which involves looking at what is lacking rather than perceiving what is there, and for the detachment of ennea-type V, inseparable from a view to the effect that it is better to "go it alone."

True as it may be that the nine features proposed above are central to the characters and may be considered from a cognitive angle, I feel that more needs to be said about the assumptions, values, and implicit beliefs of each of the characters.

We may say that any of the interpersonal styles into which the passions can crystallize involves a measure of idealization; a hidden view to the effect that such is the way to live. In the psychotherapeutic process sometimes it is possible to recover the memory of a time in life when a decision was made to take revenge, never to love again, to go it alone and never to trust, and so on. When this is possible, we can still make explicit many computations that a person has been taking as truths ever since and which can be questioned; computations of a child in pain and panic that need to be revised, as Ellis proposes in his *Rational-EmofiveTherapy.*

Perhaps we may say that each cognitive style is shaped by the characteristic already described in the enneagram of chief features or fixations, yet a number of assumptions exist within the domain of this cognitive style, and each of these

assumptions, in turn, is something that we take for granted, and each generates perceptional distortions and false judgments in the course of ordinary life, such as Beck has proposed with his concept of automatic thoughts. Here, for example, is an incomplete list of assumptions typically connected with the ennea-types:

In type I the individual feels that natural impulses are not to be trusted, but controlled, and that duty is more important than pleasure. Pleasure, indeed, tends to be regarded as a negative value in that it interferes with what needs to be done. Also the individual's notions of goodness and correctness are implicitly authoritarian in that they are extrinsic to his experience.

In type II is implicit the idea that everything is permissible in the name of love (as was dramatized by Ibsen in his famous play The Doll House where the heroine cannot understand that signing hey deceased father's name on a check could bother the bank, since it was done in all good intention). To sustain this perspective, in turn, the person has come to believe that emotion is more important than thinking, and when the two conflict, it is thinking that is to be disregarded. It is congruent to his or her behavior for the individual, also, to feel that it is necessary to be seductive in life, that it is legitimate to manipulate others given the way people are. Not only does he pridefully feel special, he or she feels that, in view of this, she deserves special privileges and attention. An assumption that is not likely to be conscious in the individual's mind, and yet may be of great importance, could be worded as "they could not do it without me." My attention was recently drawn to it through the comments of an acquaintance who, after returning to ordinary life from a spiritual retreat, commented on how shaken he had felt by the insight that the world had continued the same without him. In other words, he was not indispensable and it was not catastrophic that he had removed his extraordinary presence from the world and not been there to assist with his enlightened opinions.

For type III it is common to feel that the world is a theater where everybody is faking. Of course, faking is the only way to success. A corollary of that is that true feelings are not to be expressed. Related to the last is what could be worded as, "I

should have no problems"; this may be understood as the result of a combination of the notion that with problems the company would not be so enjoyable plus an over-valuation of pleasing. More basic, I think, is the mistaken assumption that the measure of value is success: what the world values has objective value and is to be valued. Another component of the perspective of type III is a hopelessness that underlies the character's optimism. There is a sense of having to be on top of things, because things would not go well without such watchfulness, and the individual has also a sense that there would be no place for her if she is not useful.

I think that the craziest of assumptions of type IV is the implicit notion that by going over the past and complaining, it may be possible to change it, and there is a need for a deep understanding that there is no point in weeping over spilt milk. There is also the assumption that the greater the need, the greater the entitlement to be loved, and a concomitant idealization of suffering (the more I suffer the more noble I am). The more apparent assumption is the sense of not being as good as others—which is a perspective inseparable from envious comparison. Also, there may be a sense of being owed a compensation by life for the suffering I have experienced.

A typical conviction in ennea-type V might be worded as: "It is better to go it alone." There is a sense that the fewer the commitments, the more that freedom and happiness are possible, and a view of people as moved by self-interest in their seeming love. There is also a sense that it is better to save one's energy or resources for a future possibility that is better than a present involvement, and the fear that through generosity one may end up with nothing. Still another conviction in ennea-type V is that it is better to need little so as not to become dependent on anything or anyone.

Some of the most apparent assumptions in ennea-type VI are bound to a particular subtype as, for instance, the avoidant sense of not being able to cope with his or her own resources, or the counter-phobic's sense of authority as a way out, personal authority as safety. Basic to all, however, is the sense that people are not to be trusted and the sense that one's intuitions and wishes are to be questioned. Authority is over-

valued yet is not perceived as necessarily good. It is usually (ambivalently) both good and bad.

In ennea-type VII there is too much a sense of being OK and feeling that others are also OK. The optimistic bias is comparable to the pessimistic bias of type IV. Nothing is seriously forbidden to the self-indulgent, for there is a sense that authority is bad and one who is clever may do what she wishes. There is also a sense of being entitled through talent and a deeper conviction that the best way to succeed is through personal charm.

The world view of ennea-type VIII is that of a struggle where the strong succeed and the weak fail. Also, it is necessary to be fearless to succeed, and to be able to risk. Just as type VIII over-values strength and disparages weakness, it over-values standing on one's own and denigrates neediness. Ennea-type VIII feels that it is OK to cause suffering in the pursuit of his satisfaction for there lingers **a** vindictiveness concerning a time when it was his turn to suffer for the satisfaction of others. If you want something you go and get it, no matter what stands in the way, he thinks. And he also thinks that "what people call virtue is just hypocrisy." To the lusty VIII person the hindrances of social authority are the enemy and one should act on one's impulses.

The adaptable ennea-type IX not only feels but thinks that the less conflict there is, the better, and it is better not to think too much, to avoid suffering. A corollary of avoiding conflict thus is a tendency to conform and to endorse a conservative ideology. At a deeper and correspondingly less rational level, however, there is a thought in him or her that it is better to deaden oneself than to risk being killed. The taboo on selfishness is not only something that exists at the feeling level but also at the intellectual. The person believes that it is not good to be selfish and that one should defer to the needs of others. A motto of type IX might be: "Do not rock the boat."

However true it may be that every interpersonal style involves a cognitive bias—in the sense of an implicit assumption that such is the best way to be—it is my impression that this does not exhaust an analysis of the cognitive aspect of each personality orientation, and thus, as I have announced in my Foreword, I am examining throughout this book, in addition to

fixations and defense mechanisms, what I call "illusions": metaphysical mistakes, implicit misconceptions regarding being.

The view that I articulate throughout the sections entitled "Existential Psychodynamics" I have called the "Nasruddin Theory of Neurosis" in reference to the famous Nasruddin joke about the lost key.

We are told that the Mullah was on all fours looking for something in one of the alleys at the market place. A friend joined him in the search for (as the Mullah explained to him) the key to his own house. Only after a long time had elapsed unsuccessfully did the friend think of asking Nasruddin, "Are you sure that you lost it here?" To which he replied, "No, I'm sure I lost it at home." "Then why are you looking for it here?" inquired his friend. "There is much more light here!" explained the Mullah.

The central idea underlying this book, then, is that we are looking for the "key" in the wrong place. What is this "key" to our liberation and to our ultimate fulfillment? Throughout these pages I call it "Being," though it could be justly said that to give it even that name is too limited and limiting. We may say that we are, but we don't have the experience of being, we don't know that we are. On the contrary, the closer the scrutiny to which we subject our experience, the more we discover at its core a sense of lack, an emptiness and insubstantiality, a lack of selfness or being. It is from the lack of perceived sense of being—it is my contention—that derives "deficiency motivation," the basic oral drive that sustains the whole libido tree.

For neurotic libido is not Eros, as Freud proposed. Eros is abundance, and deficiency is the search for abundance, ordinary motivation. Subsumed under the appellation of libido is "passional," and "passions" which span the spectrum of neurotic motivation are only approximately speaking "instinct derivatives." More exactly, they are the expression of a striving

to recover a sense of being that was lost through organismic interference.[14]

It may be said that there is an original psychodynamics at the time of the genesis of the character in childhood and a sustaining psychodynamics in the adult, and I am proposing that these two are not identical. While the original psychodynamics constitutes a response to the crucial issue of being loved or not— or more specifically a response to interpersonal frustration, we may say that it is not principally a love frustration that sustains deficiency motivation in the adult, but an experience of lack that is based upon a self-perpetuated ontic vacuum and the corresponding existential self-interference.

A statement for the systematic analysis of all character structures in light of ontic obscuration and the "search for Being in the wrong place" has been Guntrip's view,[15] where he writes: "Psychoanalytic theory had for a long time the appearance of the exploration of a circle which had no obvious center until ego psychology got on the way. Exploration had to begin with peripheral phenomena — behavior, moods, symptoms, conflicts, 'mental mechanisms,' erotic drives, aggression, fears, guilt, psychotic and psychoneurotic states, instincts and impulses, erotogenic zones, maturational stages and so on. All this is naturally important and must find its place in the total theory, but actually it is all secondary to some absolutely fundamental factor which is the 'core' of the 'person as such.' "

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[14]Coherently with Kohut's notion of a perturbation of the self underlying narcissistic disorders but more generally, the view spelled out here is one that understands such "perturbation of the self" as the core of every form of psychopathology, and the inevitable result of not only fragmentation but the more general perturbation of organismic self-regulation that underlies it.

[15]op. cit.

It is the felt absence of such a core that I am positing as the core of all psychopathology.[16] Such a fundamental factor at the root of all passions (deficiency motivation) is a thirst for being that exists side by side with a dim apprehension of being-loss.

I will only add to this theory at this point the contention that wherever "being" may seem to be, it is not; and that being can only be found in the most unlikely manner: through the acceptance of non-being and a journey through emptiness.

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[16]Guntrip uses the term ego "to denote a state or developmental condition of the psychic whole, the entire self. 'Ego' expresses the psyche's self-realization and every psychic process has 'ego-quality', be it that of a weak ego or a strong one" (p.194, op.cit.). Of ego-weakness, Guntrip writes: "There is a greater or lesser degree of immaturity in the personality structure of all human beings and this Immaturity is experienced as a definite weakness and inadequacy of the ego..." Also "The feeling of weakness arises out of a lack of a reliable feeling of one's own reality and identity as an ego." (p.176, op.cit). Of course, I have chosen to speak of 'being" or "sense of being" rather than "ego" or "self-identity" for the core of the healthy person, and of "ontic deficiency" or "ontic obscuration" for the core of neurosis —instead of adopting Laing's "ontic insecurity" or Guntrip's "ego weakness," both of which evoke a specific (ennea-type VI) nuance of a more universal experience.